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Abstract: The paper empirically examines CEO compensation 
in 125 UK high technology firms in an attempt to identify and 
understand any changes in the pay system evident after the 
global technology market correction in 2000. We find 
evidence that link between executive pay and market returns 
weakened and that the fixed component of executive pay in 
these companies rose post-adjustment. These changes appear 
to compensate executives for the increased risk associated 
with variable pay rather than rectify any perceived problems 
with executive incentives pre-2000.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The rapid decline in the market values of high technology 
(high-tech) public companies at the end of the twentieth 
century generated enormous interest in the pay of executives 
in this industry. The large pay packages received by high-tech 
executives in the late 1990s were already the subject of much 
public and media attention before the technology market crash 
of 2000 [1] [2]. However, defenders of these payments 
suggested that the large rewards were commensurate with the 
astronomical rise in value of these companies [3] [4]. As such, 
we see the joining of a traditional battle in the technology 
industry: Is top executive pay linked with firm performance?  
There is an extensive literature on management 
remuneration, but most of these studies lack focus on high-
tech firms. Compared to other industries, the high-tech sector 
relies heavily on human capital and intangible assets and 
operates in a more uncertain and competitive environment. 
One of the distinguishing features of pay systems in high-tech 
industries is the prevalence of stock option plans [5] [6]. 
Liccione [7] revealed that more than 96 percent of the direct 
pay of the typical technology executive came through annual 
bonuses and stock options. A detailed analysis of the pay of 
executives in these firms thus contributes to our understanding 
of this rapidly changing industrial environment, and also 
facilitates the comparison of behaviours before and after the 
rapid revaluation of these companies in the crisis of 2000. 
The global technology market was booming in the 1990s. 
Share prices relative to corporate earnings, especially those in 
the high-tech markets, had been rising steadily. 
Simultaneously, top management of the high-tech firms 
received large payments through the exercise of the stock 
options they held. A survey performed by the Roper Center 
showed that 79 percent of respondents agreed that CEOs were 
overpaid [8]. Investors rarely expressed such concerns: 
presumably because they were happy with what they were 
able to make through the appreciation in share values. This 
bull run came to an end in 2000, and there is some evidence 
that this changed investors‟ sentiment. Liccione [7] noted that 
there were changes in pay philosophy and practice in high-
tech firms after the crash: arguing that stock options could not 
effectively motivate employees to work toward business goals 
in this environment, and citing increasing market demands for 
profitability from technology firms. This evidence is not 
entirely convincing and little other research has been carried 
out that tries to identify any changes in the way that the high-
tech companies reward their executives post-crisis. This paper 
attempts to address this gap directly. 
Some studies investigating the impacts of recent financial 
crises argue that compensation schemes which encourage 
excess risk taking might have helped to cause the financial 
crises or scandals [9].  The investigation report issued by the 
United States Senate [10] also asserts that excessive 
compensation is one of the reasons for Enron‟s collapse. 
These results suggest that developing compensation plans that 
align executive and shareholder interests is critical. The 2000 
technology market crisis permits us to examine changes in the 
executive pay structure of this peculiar sector before and after 
the crisis, and encourages reflection on the usefulness of 
existing theory for understanding these changes. The purpose 
of this paper is to compare the pay structure and determinants 
before and after the market adjustment in 2000. The results of 
this study not only expand our knowledge of changes in CEO 
pay, but also provide perspective on the design of executive 
compensation package for companies in technology field.  
 
II. EXECUTIVE PAY IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES 
The asymmetry of information between executives and 
shareholders is more pronounced in the high technology sector 
than in other industries due to the nature of the business [11]. 
Viewed from the principal-agent perspective, this asymmetry 
should create greater emphasis on performance-related pay to 
deal with the relatively high agency costs that might otherwise 
manifest [11]. Conversely, shorter product life cycles and 
acute market competition put high-tech executives in a more 
dynamic and riskier working environment [12]. Risk-averse 
managers will find it difficult to diversify this risk, and this 
could make performance-related pay more costly in high-tech 
companies [5] [11].  
The net effect of these two phenomena are an empirical 
question, and existing work suggests that high-tech companies 
should offer higher basic pay and make more use of bonus and 
long-term incentives to attract and retain talent [13]. In fact, 
executives in high-tech firms have a relatively high proportion 
of incentive compensation which is more often linked to stock 
prices [5] [13]. Some fluctuations in stock prices are, of course, 
determined by forces beyond the control of the managers [14], 
and as such market performance will not completely reflect 
managerial effort. In the late 1990s, while many high-tech 
companies were still unprofitable, stock prices were increasing 
rapidly because of irrational market expectation and 
speculation [15]. The resulting bubble eventually collapsed in 
April 2000.  
Liccione [7] reports an examination of US proxy data from 
high-tech companies in 1998 and 1999, revealing a weaker 
emphasis on cash compensation and a stronger emphasis on 
stock options in high-tech firms in 1999 relative to executives 
in other industries (Exhibit 2, p. 22). He also suggests that the 
components of direct pay in technology companies became 
more like those in traditional firms after the bubble burst, with 
typical salaries for executives in high-tech firms rising at 
roughly twice the pace of those in other firms, while bonuses 
and option grants grew more slowly (Exhibit 1, p. 22). These 
results provide a useful benchmark against which to consider 
the analyses in this paper.  
 
III. THE COMPENSATION DETERMINANTS 
A. Firm Performance 
Agency theory argues that conflicts of interest dominate in 
the presence of asymmetric information unless an effective 
disciplinary and incentive system is in place. Previous 
literature has suggested the adoption of a pay for performance 
mechanism linking CEO pay to shareholder wealth [16]. 
Conventional proxies for performance are market performance 
and economic performance. Evidence of the link between 
executive pay and market and/or economic performance is 
mixed.  Some studies show a positive link between pay and 
firm performance, others report no link, and some even report 
a negative association [16] [17].   
Given previous evidence suggesting that high-tech 
executives receive a large proportion of their pay through 
options and other share-based mechanisms [1] [7] [14]. we 
expect that CEO remuneration in high-tech firms to be closely 
linked to market performance. The corollary of this point is 
that the link with economic performance may be quite weak, 
particularly given that many high-tech companies struggle to 
generate accounting profits. Indeed, for companies in network 
industries who are pursuing corporate strategies that are the 
modern equivalent of a „land grab‟, any meaningful economic 
profits in the short term could be seen as a failure to deliver on 
long run profitability. Hence, we anticipate that the link 
between pay and accounting performance might be weak.  
Liccione [7] noted that after the crash, equity markets 
began to demand evidence of profitability from high-tech 
companies in order to justify high stock prices. This 
refocusing of investor objectives might also drive companies 
to increase the links between executive pay and profitability, 
though the profitability of these companies is still weak after 
the crisis. This change in labour demand might be matched by 
a change in preferences on the supply side. Falling stock 
prices greatly reduced the wealth and option incomes of 
executives, as well as exposing them to greater uncertainty 
about future earnings. These factors might make forms of 
compensation that are not linked to equity prices more 
appealing to executives [29].  
B. Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance structures are thought to help align 
executive incentives with those of shareholders, improve 
meritocracy in boardrooms, reduce the risk of fraud, and 
safeguard the wealth of stakeholders [18]. Recommendations 
for the existence and composition of these corporate 
governance structures have garnered substantial attention from 
regulators and academics (The Combined Code, 1998; The 
New Combined Code, 2003 and [19]). Some governance 
recommendations are designed to restrain executive excesses. 
For example, the advocacy of increased non-executive board 
membership, the separation of roles between chairmen and 
CEOs, and the delegation of functions and power to sub-
committees all represent attempts to limit the ability of CEOs 
to pursue private agendas rather than shareholder wealth.  
Corporate governance codes in the UK limit the ability of 
CEOs to set their own pay. That said, a smaller proportion of 
high-tech firms followed these corporate governance 
guidelines in the 1990s relative to other industries [20]. 
Beasley et al. [21] examined the governance structures of 
companies in the technology, health care and financial 
services industries. They compared the structures present in 
companies exhibiting fraud in financial statements with a 
control group, and they found that corporate governance 
mechanisms are usually weak in the sample of „fraudulent‟ 
companies.  
The collapse of share prices in technology markets, 
coupled with scandals related to Enron and WorldCom, has 
reminded companies and investors of the importance of good 
corporate governance. As such, we anticipate an enhanced role 
for corporate governance structures in regulating the pay of 
CEOs in high-tech companies.  
C. Capital Structure 
Share ownership is one focus in contemporary 
compensation and performance studies. Denis et al. [22] 
pointed out that ownership structure has an important 
influence on internal monitoring efforts.  The most commonly 
studied ownership groups are managerial shareholdings and 
institutional shareholdings. Many previous studies report that 
increases in director and blockholder shareholdings strengthen 
their monitoring role and facilitate increases in executive pay 
[23] [24]. Some studies also consider CEO shareholding. 
Notably, Core et al., [23] and Cheng and Firth [24] all report a 
negative relation between executive pay and shareholding. 
Explanations for this phenomenon include: (1) the dividend 
income is sufficient reward for executives; (2) top 
management may deflect criticism for high salaries, bonuses, 
etc.; (3) restraints in executive pay facilitate similar restraints 
on pay for lower level employees [24].  
During the late 1990s the share prices of high-tech 
companies climbed and investors ignored criticisms of the pay 
levels: presumably because they could realize abundant 
returns in the marketplace [15]. The change in the market 
eliminated these paper gains, and with it the indulgent 
sentiment of the shareholders. Shareholders scrutinized 
company performance more closely, and paid greater attention 
to the activities of top management. As such, we hypothesize 
that changes in the attitudes of the shareholders and directors 
after the market adjustment should increase monitoring 
activity, and thus increase their restraint of executive pay after 
the crash.  
Cheng and Firth [24] confirm that executive owners in 
quoted companies are likely to receive lower emolument than 
executive employees. Elson [25] notes that high-tech 
executives hold a greater percentage of their companies‟ 
shares and argues that directors with substantial shareholdings 
would be much more appropriate custodians of companies 
after the adjustment.  As such, we expect that high-tech 
executives, like their counterparts in other industries, would be 
more willing to accept lower compensation after the crash.   
 
IV. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Data and Source 
The data comes from a census of the high-tech companies 
listed on London Stock Exchange from 1998 to 2002. Only 
companies whose major activities are based in the UK are 
included in the sample. In order to generate useful measures of 
market return and change after the market adjustment, 
companies with data less for than three years are excluded 
from the resulting sample. All nominal values are converted to 
real values using the retail price index.  
The sample of high-tech firms includes companies that 
engage in computer hardware, semiconductors, 
telecommunication equipment, software, computer services 
and Internet business, and which are quoted on techMARK. 
The final number of companies in this sample is 125 and the 
total number of observations is 553 consisting of 85 cases in 
1998, 98 in 1999, 125 in 2000, 125 in 2001 and 120 in 2002.  
The study covers five years beginning in April 1998. The 
first two of these years come before the high-tech market 
correction in April 2000, and the last two come after the 
adjustment. Comparison of these two sets of two years enables 
us to examine variations before and after the market 
adjustment.  
Information about chief executive officers and corporate 
governance institutions are obtained from the annual reports. 
Financial information is taken from the DATASTREAM and 
FAME databases.  
B. Research Method 
We use panel data analysis to model the relation between 
CEO pay and its determinants. We first split the dataset in to 
two sub-panels: 1998-1999 and 2001-2002.  This allows 
isolation of the periods before and after the rapid adjustment 
of share prices in technology markets. We then compare the 
regression coefficients for these two periods. The basic form 
of our model is: 
 
CEOPAYi,t= β0 + β1MKTRTNi,t + β2ROEi,t + β3%NONEXEi,t + β4SEPROLEi,t 
+ β5REMCOMi,t + β6%DIRSHRi,t + β7%Blki,t + β8%CEOSHRi,t + 
β9CONTROLi,t + εi,t 
 
where, 
CEOPAY is further divided into the following measures: 
Ln_SALBON: Logarithm of SALARY and bonus 
Ln_TTLPAY:  Logarithm of SALBON and realized gains from 
exercising options and long-term incentives 
Ln_PAYOPTDIFF: Logarithm of TTLPAY and increase in the value of 
options held at the end of the fiscal year 
MKTRTN: Market return per outstanding share 
ROE: Return on shareholders‟ equity  
%NONEXE: Percentage of nonexecutive directors on the board of directors 
SEPROLE: Dummy variable, 1 if the incident exists, 0 otherwise 
RECOM: Existing of a remuneration committee. Dummy variable, 1 if the 
incident exists, 0 otherwise 
%DIRSHR: Proportion of shares owned by the directors to the total issued 
shares 
%BLK: Proportion of shares owned by the substantial outside shareholders to 
the total issued shares 
%CEOSHR: Proportion of beneficial shares owned by the CEO to the total 
issued shares 
CONTROL: Control variables are used to control the effects of firm size, 
industry and CEO traits on the CEO compensation 
 
The dependent variables are different measures of high-
tech CEO compenstion. The independent variables comprise 
the measures of corporate performance, corporate governance, 
ownership structure and control variables.  
 
V. RESULTS 
The following tables report the econometric results of the 
changes of the relations between CEO pay and determinants 
after the high-tech adjustment in 2000. The first two columns 
of each table show the regression coefficients and t-statistics 
associated with the pre-adjustment and post-adjustment 
periods. The third column reports a t-statistic for the null 
hypothesis that the two coefficients in the first column are 
equal.  
Table 1 presents the regression results for the logarithm of 
salary-plus-bonus (Ln_SALBON). As can be seen, 
remuneration committees (REMCOM) and CEO 
shareholdings (%CEOSHR) are positively related to pay. 
Market returns (MKTRTN) are positively linked to pay in this 
period, while there is no such link between accounting returns 
(ROE) and pay. This suggests that boards had market returns 
rather than accounting profits in mind when setting executive 
bonuses during this period. Directors‟ ownership is negatively 
associated with CEO salary-plus-bonus levels.  
Post-adjustment the proxies for ownership structure 
(%DIRSHR, %BLK and %CEOSHR) exhibit inverse relations 
with salary-plus-bonus. They also show that the positive 
relation between the existence of a remuneration committee 
and executive pay breaks down. These results provide 
evidence that monitoring is strengthened after 2000. Again, 
these changes in the significance pattern are suggestive, but 
the t-tests for the difference in coefficients are equivocal. We 
see clear evidence only of differences in the constants and in 
the coefficients associated with the existence of remuneration 
committees and the shareholdings of CEOs.  
 
 
Table 2 displays the results for the logarithm of salary, 
bonus and realized gains from LTIPS (Ln_TTLPAY). The 
findings for the pre-adjustment period reveal that market 
returns (MKTRTN) are positively related to total pay, while 
there is no relation with accounting return (ROE). The 
coefficients associated with the proportion of non-executive 
directors on the board (%NONEXE) are not significantly 
different from zero, but again we see that the existence of a 
remuneration committee (REMCOM) is associated with 
higher levels of pay. The ownership structure coefficients are 
insignificant in the pre-adjustment period, though CEO‟s 
equity holding displays a weak positive relation (%CEOSHR). 
Post-adjustment, the results show a complete collapse in the 
relation between pay and performance. As with the  results in 
Table 1, we see that the relation between remuneration 
committees and pay evaporates, and we see a growing 
importance of ownership structure: block ownership and CEO 
shareholdings now appear to restrain executive pay. The 
differences in coefficients for remuneration committees, CEO 
shareholdings and the constants are significant at conventional 
levels.  
Finally, Table 3 illustrates the findings for the logarithm of 
salary, bonus, gains from LTIPs and the growth in the value of 
options held by CEOs (Ln_PAYOPTDIFF). In the pre-
adjustment period market performance (MKTRTN) has a 
strong and positive relation with the level of the pay package. 
Little else appears to matter, though the establishment of a 
remuneration committee (REMCOM) shows a positive 
coefficient on the fringes of significance (t=1.928). The 
relation between pay and performance has eroded post-
adjustment, and we see the increased importance of 
blockholder and CEO share ownership. The test of the 
difference of these coefficients between periods is 
insignificant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Table 1 
 
Ln_SALBON 
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
PERIODS 
98 & 99 01 & 02 T - Test 
Constant 6.728 
(14.496)*** 
8.340 
(19.553)*** 
2.4968** 
MKTRTN 0.030 
(2.613)*** 
0.015 
(0.304) 
0.2366 
 
ROE -0.003 
(-1.086) 
-0.027 
(-1.256) 
0.8914 
%NONEXE -0.180 
(-0.776) 
0.389 
(1.771)* 
1.7287* 
SEPROLE 0.055 
(0.692) 
-0.115 
(-1.238) 
1.2964 
REMCOM 0.396 
(3.760)*** 
-0.071 
(-0.505) 
2.4143** 
%DIRSHR -0.455 
(-2.038)** 
-0.453 
(-2.461)** 
0.0077 
%BLK -0.103 
(-0.450) 
-0.572 
(-3.995)*** 
1.8308* 
%CEOSHR 
 
CONTROL 
N 
Adjusted R2 
0.890 
(3.075)*** 
Yes 
145 
0.630 
-0.668 
(-2.407)** 
Yes 
218 
0.586 
3.7615*** 
* significant at the 0.10 level;  
** significant at the 0.05 level;  
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Results corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Table 2 
 
Ln_TTLPAY 
 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN  
PERIODS 
98 & 99 01 & 02 T - Test 
Constant 5.500 
(7.122)*** 
8.086 
(16.576)*** 
-2.9775*** 
MKTRTN 0.059 
(1.985)** 
-0.039 
(-0.688) 
1.3451 
 
ROE -0.0002 
(-0.037) 
-0.015 
(-0.827) 
0.6574 
%NONEXE -0.769 
(-1.844)* 
0.156 
(0.532) 
-1.8700* 
SEPROLE 0.226 
(1.660)* 
-0.107 
(-0.855) 
1.7974* 
REMCOM 0.577 
(3.434)*** 
-0.093 
(-0.492) 
2.4831** 
%DIRSHR -0.253 
(-0.635) 
-0.437 
(-1.783)* 
0.4151 
%BLK -0.246 
(-0.898) 
-0.633 
(-3.256)*** 
1.1825 
%CEOSHR 
 
CONTROL 
N 
Adjusted R2 
0.698 
(1.955)* 
Yes 
145 
0.453 
-1.121 
(-3.090)*** 
Yes 
218 
0.483 
3.4214*** 
* significant at the 0.10 level;   
** significant at the 0.05 level;  
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level.  
Results corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
Table 3 
 
Ln_PAYOPTDIFF 
 
DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN  PERIODS 
98 & 99 01 & 02 T - Test 
Constant 4.695 
(3.416)*** 
7.366 
(12.066)*** 
1.9827** 
MKTRTN 0.298 
(7.002)*** 
0.169 
(1.643) 
0.9812 
 
ROE -0.024 
(-1.173) 
0.007 
(0.342) 
-1.0352 
%NONEXE -0.201 
(-0.313) 
0.276 
(0.605) 
-0.6224 
SEPROLE 0.061 
(0.292) 
-0.083 
(-0.621) 
0.6084 
REMCOM 0.786 
(1.928)* 
0.013 
(0.041) 
1.5040 
%DIRSHR 0.330 
(0.490) 
-0.056 
(-0129) 
0.5047 
%BLK -0.086 
(-0.172) 
-0.502 
(-2.111)** 
0.8290 
%CEOSHR 
 
CONTROL 
N 
Adjusted R2 
-0.017 
(-0.025) 
Yes 
145 
0.511 
-1.008 
(-2.281)** 
Yes 
218 
0.427 
1.2845 
* significant at the 0.10 level;  
** significant at the 0.05 level;  
***statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
Results corrected for heteroskedasticity 
 
VI. DISCUSSION  
Previous studies [5] [13] suggest that the prominent 
feature of executive rewards in high-tech industries is the 
extensive use of options. This study confirms this diagnosis.   
The change of the effect of remuneration committee on 
CEO pay in the post-adjustment period indicates changes of 
pay philosophy and practice in high-tech firms.  Main and 
Johnston [26] argue that the purpose of a remuneration 
committee is neither to hold down nor boost up the pay level. 
A remuneration committee is expected to tie the shareholders‟ 
interest to performance. The positive link between the CEO 
pay and the existence of a remuneration committee before the 
market adjustment reflects the focus of the management board 
and shareholders on market performance.  They are willing to 
accept a high pay level if the firm‟s share price is favourable. 
After the adjustment, the shareholders suffer a severe loss on 
the stock market. The evaporation of the positive relation 
between the remuneration committee and CEO pay illustrates 
a change in the shareholders‟ philosophy and sentiment: their 
interests are tied to an extent beyond stock performance. 
The decline in performance-based pay also creates a need 
for increased monitoring by shareholders, as the links between 
pay and performance are essentially non-existent in the post-
adjustment period, and this might be thought to decrease the 
alignment between the financial interests of executives and 
shareholders. Consistent with this expectation, our results 
point to an increased impact of outside shareholders on 
executive pay after 2000, and suggest reclamation of 
remuneration committees from executive control.  
CEO share ownership declines significantly after the 
adjustment. Before the market adjustment, CEOs with large 
ownership shares of their companies received more 
compensation than those with fewer shares, but this situation 
reversed after the market adjustment. The change is consistent 
with managerial power theory whereby CEO power leads to 
rent seeking and weaker governance structures [27]. 
Speculation drove the tech market boom of the 1990s. 
Sentiment of investors/shareholders in high-tech firms, was 
driven by rapidly rising share prices. Comparatively, little 
attention was given to corporate governance and executive pay.  
CEOs, especially those who held more shares of the 
companies, became powerful in determining their own pay 
and benefits. The significant positive relation between CEO 
pay and shareholding in the pre-adjustment period illustrates 
this argument.   
Cheng and Firth [24] argued that CEOs with high 
shareholdings may be willing to accept lower pay: perhaps 
because dividend income may be sufficient to cover CEOs‟ 
needs; perhaps because a lower level of executive 
remuneration might suppress wage demands from other 
employees; and perhaps because it may deflect public 
criticism of excessive pay to top management. In the post-
adjustment period, the sharp decline in high-tech share prices 
shocked the public. Disgruntled shareholders and media 
refocused on economic performance and criticized excess 
management compensation in the high tech firms. The results 
show that while blockholders and boards strengthened their 
monitoring roles, CEO owners were willing to reduce their 
pay to deflect media criticism and share the pain with other 
investors after the high tech market adjustment. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS  
UK high-tech firms grew dramatically in the late 1990s 
[28]. The growth was so rapid that a special market was 
launched on the London Stock Exchange in 1999. While there 
is an extensive research on the topics of executive 
remuneration, only a limited number of studies have examined 
technology industries [5] [11 [14], and most of these studies 
examine data from the US. Previous studies have revealed that 
the pay structure and practice in high-tech firms is different 
from the structure and practice in other companies, but little is 
known about top management pay in the UK high-tech sector. 
The collapse of the technology market in 2000 is a good 
opportunity for us to acquire some valuable information on the 
changes to executive pay in this sector. The objectives of this 
study are to understand the remuneration of top executives in 
UK high-tech companies, and to investigate any changes that 
may have occurred after the stock market adjustment in 2000.  
The burst of the bubble in technology stocks created 
many repercussions in financial markets that have affected 
pension plans, personal wealth, etc. However, despite the 
changes to corporate performance in the technology sector, as 
well as the changes in the governance arrangements and 
ownership structures in these companies after the market 
adjustment, it appears that CEO pay has become less 
responsive to performance than before, and that this has been 
offset by increases in fixed components of pay.  
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